Policy Gridlock in Regional Budget Politics: The Case of APBD in Kuantan Singingi Regency, Indonesia (2022–2024)
Abstract
This study examines the phenomenon of policy gridlock in the formulation and approval of the Regional Revenue and Expenditure Budget (APBD) in Kuantan Singingi Regency, Indonesia, during the 2022–2024 fiscal years. Policy gridlock, characterized by delays, conflicts, and the inability of stakeholders to reach timely consensus, has become a recurring issue in regional budget politics, potentially undermining governance effectiveness and public service delivery. This study aims to analyze the underlying factors contributing to gridlock and to explore its implications for regional governance. This study employs a qualitative approach using a case study design. Data were collected through in-depth interviews with key stakeholders, including local government officials, members of the regional parliament (DPRD), and policy experts, as well as through document analysis of official budget reports, meeting minutes, and regulatory frameworks. The data were analyzed using thematic analysis to identify patterns of conflict, negotiation dynamics, and institutional constraints. The findings reveal that policy gridlock in the APBD process is primarily driven by political bargaining among elites, misalignment of interests between the executive and legislative branches, limited transparency, and institutional weaknesses in budget governance. Additionally, external pressures and bureaucratic inefficiencies further exacerbate delays in budget approval. As a result, gridlock negatively affects the timeliness of budget implementation, disrupts development programs, and reduces the overall effectiveness of public service delivery. This study contributes to the literature on public policy and regional governance by highlighting the structural and political dimensions of budgetary gridlock in decentralized systems. It also provides practical recommendations for improving coordination mechanisms, strengthening institutional capacity, and enhancing transparency in regional budget processes to mitigate future gridlock.
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Copyright (c) 2026 Andriansyah Andriansyah, Sujianto Sujianto, Muchid Muchid, Auradian Marta
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